spotlight europe 2008/02, February 2008: The Sarkozy Mystery by Fritz-Vannahme, Joachim.
 
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
#
 
2
0
0
8
/
0
2
 
spotlight europe 
# 2008/02 – February 2008 
The Sarkozy Mystery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joachim Fritz-Vannahme 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, joachim.vannahme@bertelsmann.de
The French communal elections in March will be the first test for Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy. The opinion polls show that, despite his initial 
popularity, Sarkozy’s approval ratings are now at their lowest ebb. At the 
same time the French are preparing the French EU-Presidency of the 
Council in the second half of 2008. Will France become more European, 
or will EU policymaking become more French? 
The French presidents of the Fifth Repub-
lic have all been actors playing a part on 
an immense stage. This is especially true 
of the present incumbent, for Nicolas 
Sarkozy, more than any of his five prede-
cessors, tries hard to be in the limelight as 
much as he can. However, the interna-
tional reviews of his acting career have 
been devastating. They all give him the 
thumbs-down, from the British The 
Economist (“The unpopular president”), 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (“No 
style and no sense of direction”) to Der 
Stern (“Egomaniac in the Elysée”) and the 
harsh Parisian irony of Le Nouvel Obser-
vateur (“Le Président introuvable” – “The 
President you just can’t find”). And the 
spectators are not going to be outdone. 
Whereas an impressive 63 per cent of 
French interviewees said they trusted him 
in June 2007, in February 2008 the TNS 
Sofres-Le Figaro barometer showed that 
his approval ratings had plummeted to 41 
per cent. Prior to this only Jacques Chirac, 
who just happened to be rather unpopular, 
had ratings which were as bad as this. 
 
The president himself may not have been 
particularly surprised, since at the height 
of “Sarkomania” last year he had predicted 
that his popularity would peter out at the 
latest at the beginning of 2008. And yet 
the steep decline in his approval ratings is 
something he needs to think about, espe-
cially since the reasons for his predictions 
back then and for the current situation are 
not the same. 
 
Sarkozy has lost the support of the French 
on account of his headline-grabbing pri-
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vate life, and not because of his hard-
hitting policies. From the time of his sepa-
ration from his wife, Cécilia, and his wed-
ding with chanson singer and model Carla 
Bruni in the Elysée Palace, the colourful 
images of the yellow press (which soon 
also began to appear elsewhere) sup-
planted the announcement and introduc-
tion of long-overdue reforms. The French 
like to say (and others like to say it about 
the French), “le style, c’est l’homme.”  The 
fact is that policymakers in Brussels and 
in Berlin-Mitte, the centre of German 
power, do not like Sarkozy’s style. For ex-
ample, in February Die Zeit commented, 
“The French president likes to go it alone, 
and for this reason the Germans find him 
rather irksome.” 
 
There can be no doubt about the fact that 
Sarkozy’s actions are spectacular and at 
times rather trying. But does that mean 
that they are of no importance? After nine 
months in power the sum total of what he 
has achieved is actually not that bad, at 
least in the area of foreign and European 
policy, which is the main subject of the 
present spotlight. However, his achieve-
ment becomes debatable as soon as the 
subject turns to Europe, for Sarkozy has 
said that he wishes to reconcile France 
and Europe. It will become apparent below 
that a price has had to be paid for this.  
 
 
 
 
 
I 
Sarko l’Américain 
We will begin with foreign policy. Within a 
short space of time Nicolas Sarkozy has 
managed to normalize the strained rela-
tionship with George W. Bush and indeed 
with American policymaking in general. 
The United States and France “remain 
true, first and foremost, to the same ideal, 
the same principles, the same values that 
have always united them,” Sarkozy de-
clared on 7 November 2007 in a speech 
before the U.S. Congress. 
 
It is of course true that each of his prede-
cessors, at least at the beginning of his 
term in office, said ingratiating things of 
this kind to his American friends. How-
ever, Sarkozy’s emotional appeal came af-
ter years of friction between Washington 
and Paris, and was greeted in Congress 
with more than respectful applause. Af-
terwards people called him “Sarkozy 
l’Américain,” and even if it is a case of in-
termingled stylization and self-stylization, 
the way in which this particular French-
man interacts with America is totally dif-
ferent to the approach adopted by his 
predecessor, Chirac. 
 
Washington also welcomed Sarkozy’s an-
nouncement that, after a lapse of forty 
years, his country would be returning to 
the military command structure of NATO 
(it never withdrew from the political ac-
tivities of the alliance). In the course of 
the year its contribution in Afghanistan  
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will increase as a result of the deployment 
of Rafale warplanes and Leclerc tanks, and 
in the coming months the aircraft carrier 
“Charles de Gaulle” will be sent to the In-
dian Ocean. In the Gulf France intends to 
establish a new military base manned by 
400 servicemen. In Europe the gesture 
was greeted with a certain amount of deri-
sion, though it was welcomed in Washing-
ton and in the region itself, where tensions 
have increased since the Iraq war and as a 
result of the aggressive policies pursued 
by Iran and its president, Ahmadinejad. 
What is primarily a strategic gesture (after 
all, there are only 400 soldiers), is none-
theless construed in the region as a sign of 
greater French interest. 
 
At the same time Sarkozy has proposed 
the establishment of an EU intervention 
force with 10,000 troops, the participants 
of which, in addition to France, would be 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy 
and Poland. Participation would be linked 
to a commitment to spend two per cent of 
GDP on defence, and to join a common de-
fence equipment market. It remains to be 
seen whether the proposals are feasible, 
and how they relate to the agreements 
reached in the Treaty of Lisbon. However, 
with this move Sarkozy has positioned 
himself at the spearhead of a common 
European defence policy–and for the time 
being this is the whole point and indeed 
the importance of his announcement. 
 
Nowhere has Sarkozy sought to close 
ranks with the Americans more than in his 
policy on Iran. “No nuclear weapon for 
Iran, an arsenal of sanctions to convince 
them, negotiations, discussions, firmness. 
For my part, I don’t use the word war,” the 
president told the New York Times on 24 
September 2007. However, in an interview 
the French foreign minister, Bernard 
Kouchner, did in fact allude to the possi-
bility of a war.   
 
Sarkozy’s policies on Iran and Lebanon 
show that he is edging towards the Ameri-
can and Israeli positions, and that he has 
shifted away quite noticeably from the 
Europeans and their sceptical attitude to-
wards sanctions. At the same time he has 
pursued a policy of active diplomacy, and 
has travelled to Arab countries from Alge-
ria to Saudi Arabia, which, for example, he 
praised in January for lending its support 
to an “open Islam”. 
 
Sarkozy’s proposals for a Mediterranean 
Union have not been greeted with a great 
deal of enthusiasm. He had already mooted 
the idea during the election campaign, and 
would like to do something memorable in 
this area during the French Presidency of 
the Council. However, there is scepticism 
about the project among policymakers in 
Berlin and on the southern rim of the 
Mediterranean. During the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung’s Middle East conference in Kron-
berg, there were frequent comments to the 
effect that the initiative was “une fausse 
bonne idée,” a good idea, but wrong. From 
Morocco to Lebanon it raises suspicions 
that in this central geopolitical area the 
EU’s protracted and not particularly suc-
cessful Mediterranean policy will be sub-
jected to some kind of face-lifting.  
“No enthusiasm for a 
Mediterranean Union  
in the EU.” 
The suggestion was rejected out of hand in 
Turkey, since at least in the election cam-
paign Sarkozy suggested that he would 
prefer Ankara to be a member of this Un-
ion instead of being given a seat and a 
vote in Brussels. And initially his German 
partners were very lukewarm about the 
idea, since it was construed as a Parisian 
move designed to play off the south 
against the east and the Mediterranean 
against the Black Sea and the Caucasus. 
Still, the wrong right idea, if it is modified 
in the right way, may turn out to be a 
really good idea. Yet everything continues 
to be in a state of flux. The Paris-based 
conference on the Mediterranean Union, 
which is being held shortly before the 
French national holiday (14 July), may 
well make an important contribution in 
this area.  
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II 
Europe – no more than  
a Union of national  
interests ? 
With regard to European policymaking 
Nicolas Sarkozy has described quite 
clearly and indeed in an emphatic manner 
what he believes needs to be done. “There 
is no doubt that the French president be-
lieves in his idea of Europe, which is 
above an alliance of national interests,” 
says Le Monde editorial writer Patrick Jar-
reau in his book “La droite contre 
l’exception française.” Published in Janu-
ary 2008, this is to date the most compre-
hensive and thorough analysis of the cur-
rent president’s policies. “When he calls 
on the Europeans to define a fresh identity 
for their common project, then he does so 
in order to bury the federal dream which 
was in evidence at the end of the last cen-
tury.”  Patrick Jarreau believes that this 
“discontinuity, which was cautiously in-
troduced and has gone virtually unnoticed, 
is the most radical that Nicolas Sarkozy 
has yet embarked upon.” 
Of course, the way Sarkozy put it at the 
beginning of January made it sound com-
pletely different. “At the end of the French 
Presidency of the Council I hope that 
Europe will have an immigration policy, a 
defence policy, an energy policy, an envi-
ronmental policy.”  The Brussels corre-
spondent of Le Monde, Thomas Ferenczi, 
was taken aback by so much French “pre-
sumption.”  “Does he really believe that a 
couple of pro-active speeches, even though 
they may be very inspired, will suffice to 
wrap up the negotiations in the nick of 
time, especially in view of the fact that 
their great complexity is becoming more 
apparent to leading European politicians 
as the months pass by?” 
 
This commentary shows quite clearly how 
much the forthcoming President of the EU 
Council is already being viewed with sus-
picion, not only in Brussels, but also in 
Berlin and other capitals. It is impossible 
to ignore his repeated attacks on the 
strong euro and the interest rate policies 
of the European Central Bank. It is diffi-
cult not to hear him voicing his displeas-
ure about having to adhere to the Maas-
tricht criteria when the French economy is 
faltering and growth is negligible, and 
about having to keep public borrowing be-
neath the 60 per cent GDP mark. In an un-
forgotten speech given in Berlin in Febru-
ary 2006, when he was still his country’s 
Minister of the Interior, Sarkozy praised 
the way Charles de Gaulle and Konrad 
Adenauer had worked together. “It was a 
time when policymaking and action were 
more important than European theology.  
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That is why I call upon the Europeans to 
take action.” Is it possible to construe the 
phrase “European theology” as an allusion 
to the philosophy of integration that pre-
vails in Brussels? 
 
Finally, scepticism abounds with regard to 
Sarkozy’s attitude to the agricultural is-
sue. In fact, during the French Presidency 
of the EU Council it is here in particular 
that he will have to show a willingness to 
compromise if he actually wishes to re-
form the EU budget in the immediate fu-
ture. Since France is a net recipient within 
the agricultural budget, it is legitimate to 
ask whether it is really going to be pre-
pared to make the necessary sacrifices.  
“Scepticism about the 
French Willigness to  
deliver an Agricultural  
Reform.” 
Last September, in a speech at a Breton 
agricultural show, Sarkozy stated that food 
independence was the top priority of EU 
agricultural reform. Does that mean pro-
tecting the European market by excluding 
(cheaper) products from the rest of the 
world? “Within forty years the prices of 
agricultural products have been halved, 
but the price of food has sunk by only 
about 14 per cent,” Sarkozy declared on 
this occasion. “That is not acceptable, that 
is an area where the state will have to in-
tervene.” Promoting market forces in the 
agricultural sector is neither what is up-
permost in Sarkozy’s mind, nor is it his 
guiding principle. Does this mean that the 
limits of the forthcoming agricultural re-
form have already been defined? 
 
III 
French schizophrenia 
France’s partners would certainly like to 
reach a better understanding of what mo-
tivates this particular president. Looking 
unceasingly at the images of his private 
life that are being bandied about in public 
is not especially helpful in this respect. In 
2005 France not only said “non” to the EU 
constitutional treaty. It also rejected what 
was deemed to be a liberal or, to use the 
French jargon, a neo-liberal kind of 
Europe. In 2007 Sarkozy was elected by 
voters who think he will pursue liberal 
economic policies capable of meeting the 
challenges of globalization, and also by 
voters who dreamt and continue to dream 
of a European bulwark against globaliza-
tion. Taken together, these preferences do 
not constitute a political philosophy, and 
in fact merely perpetuate a kind of schizo-
phrenia which French society has dis-
played from time to time since the very 
beginnings of the EEC. People live and 
prosper in and from a free trade zone, but 
have profound reservations about a market 
economy. 
 
Before the referendum the opponents of 
the constitution based their arguments 
mainly on Part III of the treaty, which to a 
large extent was a summary of basic texts 
that had accumulated since the Treaties of 
Rome. Last year, in order to ingratiate 
himself with these critics, the newly 
elected President proceeded to sacrifice 
the principle of “free and undistorted 
competition,” which in the Treaty of Lis-
bon has been removed from the main text 
and relegated to a lowly protocol.  
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As a candidate and after the election 
Sarkozy repeatedly promised to “bring 
France back to Europe.” However, to date 
it has not been a free ride. And as far as 
Sarkozy is concerned, France has been 
back in Europe since February, since, as a 
result of a constitutional amendment, 
there is now nothing which can prevent 
the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
“Now that Europe can decide, the problem 
is to know what it wants,” he declared on 
10 February in a television address. 
 
France’s EU partners quickly recovered 
from the shock of seeing the principle of 
competition banished to the footnotes. It 
was at most a formality, for in the final 
analysis the Brussels procedures and the 
Treaty of Lisbon itself are permeated with 
the spirit of free and undistorted competi-
tion. That of course is not the crux of the 
matter. Is Sarkozy, who must surely have 
noticed this alteration, trying to reconcile 
the French with Europe by giving them 
small favours of this kind? Or is he really 
trying to “reconcile” Europe with the 
French “non”? 
 
If the first happens to be true, then 
France’s partners and Berlin in particular 
should exercise restraint, and, despite the 
various irritations, should in fact try to 
help and support the social therapist in 
the Elysée.  
 
On the other hand, if the second happens 
to be true, there will not only be a danger 
of “French presumption.”  It may well lead 
to a reordering and rearrangement of the 
whole balance of power within the EU, and 
would make it very difficult for the experi-
enced Franco-German duo to reach agree-
ment, since France would be moving to-
wards British, Dutch, Czech or even Swed-
ish positions. Nicolas Sarkozy’s France 
would become a leading eurosceptical 
power.  
 
By the end of the year at the latest, after 
the conclusion of the French Presidency of 
the Council, Europe will know what the 
answer is. Many people will not find it 
easy to deal with this president, his pleth-
ora of ideas, his linguistic agility, and his 
carefully stage-managed speeches.  
 
However, Sarkozy’s contradictions may 
also be a reason for hope. As the European 
debate continues. the Colbertist could once 
again become a liberal, the protectionist a 
proponent of free trade, and France’s so-
cial therapist a respected leading politi-
cian in the EU. 
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